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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Caperton 
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 1 without hearing some variant of the following response: 
"I can't believe it was as close as it was." And whether one is chatting with his 
next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life, or 
discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert,2 nearly everyone seems to 
agree: Caperton was an "easy" case and the fact that four justices dissented 
* J.D., Stanford Law School; Fellow, Stanford Center on the Legal Profession. I am particularly grateful 
to Samuel Bray, Nora Freeman Engstrom, and Amanda Packel for their helpful comments. 
I. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
2. The terms "recusal" and "disqualification" are used interchangeably throughout this Article. These 
terms originally had slightly different meanings, with "recusal" referring to withdrawal at the judge's discretion 
and "disqualification" meaning exclusion by force of law. Modernly, however, this distinction is almost never 
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES§ I. I at 3-4 (2d ed. 2007). 
recognized. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND 
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indicates that something is terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the 
issue of judicial impartiality to the national spotlight, but it has also triggered a 
firestorm: Congress has held hearings examining judicial recusals in light of 
Caperton;3 states have grappled with new recusal rules and procedures, as well as 
changes to state judicial elections;4 and law schools around the country have held 
conferences and symposia dedicated solely to Caperton and judicial ethics.5 
Together with the Court's earlier ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White6 and this year's decision in Citizens United v. FEC,7 Caperton is part of a 
trilogy that will shape our views of judicial independence and accountability for 
years to come. 
This Article argues that Caperton is often misunderstood and concludes that 
Caperton was not an easy case, in large part because the Court rejected the well­
established appearances-based recusal standard in favor of a probability-based 
one that examines the likelihood of actual bias.8 While Caperton's changes to the 
law are seemingly minor, this Article asserts that these changes, in fact, affect the 
recusal landscape more than is or has been appreciated. Furthermore, Caperton's 
probability-based standard may contain a blueprint for an improved recusal 
framework across state and federal judiciaries. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explains the role of appearances, 
both historically and currently, in recusal decisions in the United States. Today, 
appearance of partiality, rather than actual fairness, is the key factor in judicial 
recusal under both the federal recusal statutes and state judicial codes. This was 
not always so. 
Part III argues that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Caperton limited, 
if not excluded, the role of appearances from its due process analysis. Some 
scholars, judges, and commentators, however, have wrongly interpreted 
Caperton's "probability of bias" standard to be coterminous with the "appearance 
of bias" standard that currently controls recusal under federal statutes and state 
judicial codes. This Article will explain why this interpretation is incorrect and 
why the Court's opinion should be read to reject an appearance-based 
disqualification standard under the Constitution's Due Process Clause. 
3. On December 10, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Competition 
held a hearing on issues related to the Capenon case. See Examining the State of Judicial Recusals After 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 11 lth Cong. (2009). 
4. Contentious debate regarding the appropriate response to Capenon took place in a number of states, 
including West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton 
Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2010) (summarizing the state court reforms in the year following Cape non). 
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215 (2009); 
Georgetown Law School Conference: State Courts and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: Will Caperton and 
Citizens United Change the Way States Pick Judges? (Jan. 26, 2010); Seattle University Conference: State 
Judicial Independence-A National Concern (Sept. 14, 2009). 
6. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
7. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
8. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263(2009). 
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The final part of this Article discusses the implications of adopting a 
probability-based-rather than an appearance-based-recusal standard, and how 
states can use Caperton, and recusal generally, to address the public's growing 
concern about the impartiality of an elected judiciary. This Article argues that in 
response to Caperton, states should change their recusal procedures and tailor 
them to the newly-announced probability-based substantive standard for judicial 
disqualification. In adopting these new recusal procedures, states should pay 
special attention to appearances, ensuring that the newly-adopted procedure 
creates an appearance of impartiality and fairness. As a result of greater emphasis 
on the appearance of procedural fairness, public's confidence in the judiciary will 
increase. 
II. THE ROLE OF APPEARANCES IN JUDICIAL RECUSALS 
In the United States, judicial recusal is largely about appearances. Under the 
federal recusal statutes, as well as the state judicial codes, judges must recuse 
themselves to avoid even the appearance of bias.9 Although universally accepted 
throughout the United States today, this is a relatively new concept. Undoubtedly 
the need for judicial impartiality was recognized in early Jewish, Roman, and 
English law,1° but there is virtually no evidence suggesting that mere appearance 
of partiality prevented judges from participating in cases before the adoption of 
an appearance-based recusal standard in the United States. 11 
A. Federal Recusal Statutes 
Judicial recusal was on the minds of our founding fathers at the time of this 
nation's birth. In 1792, Congress passed the United States' first recusal statute. 12 
The legislation was narrowly drawn, narrowly interpreted, and did not even 
prohibit judges from hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or against 
9. FLAMM, supra note 2, §§ 5.6-5.6.1, at 118-19; Susan E. Liontas, Judicial Elections Have No Winners, 
20 STETSON L. REV. 309, 312 (1990). 
10. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for disqualification in the 
thirteenth century: 
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a suspicion, which arises 
from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent 
or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his kinsman or a member of his household, or a table­
companion, or he has been his counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, or in any such 
like capacity. 
BRACTON, LEGJBUS ET CONSUETUDINIUS ANGLIE 249 (Travers Twiss ed., 1883). 
11. In 18th century England, for instance, the common-law recusal practice was exceedingly simple: 
Only if he had a direct financial interest in the case was the judge to be presumed biased and disqualified. John 
P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-12 (1947). This was the law at the time of the 
colonization of America, rejecting the broader standard contained in BRACTON, supra note 10. 
12. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, I Stat. 275, 278-79 ( 1792). 
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a party. 13 The statute largely codified the common-law disqualification rules and 
called for disqualification of district court judges who were "concerned in 
interest," as well as those who had "been of counsel for either party."14 Even in 
the late nineteenth century, a judge was permitted to preside over a bankruptcy 
proceeding despite his status as a creditor of the bankrupt. 15 
Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was amended and 
shaped, often in response to high-profile scandals or controversies involving 
federal judges. The federal statute that governs disqualification by any federal 
court today, 28 U.S.C. § 455, is divided into two parts. 16 The first section (and for 
our purposes the most relevant), § 455(a), is a general catch-all provision that 
requires disqualification whenever "[a judge's] impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned."11 It is now uncontroverted that this standard was intended to 
promote not only the impartiality of the judiciary but also the public perception 
of the impartiality of the judicial process. 18 As a result, a mere appearance of bias, 
as viewed from the perspective of an objective observer, requires recusal. 
B. ABA Codes ofJudicial Conduct 
While 28 U.S.C. § 455 is controlling only in federal courts, nearly every state 
has adopted the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct. 19 The 
Code, which applies to all full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal 
proceedings, addresses when judicial disqualification is necessary.20 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 

IS. In re Sime, 22. F. Cas. 145, 146 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 12,860). 

16. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
17. Id. § 4SS(a). The second section, 28 U.S.C. § 45S(b), enumerates certain specific factual situations 
when recusal is required. For example, disqualification is mandatory when the judge "has . . . personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" or if the judge previously served as the 
lawyer, or had been a material witness, in the matter in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 4SS(b)(l)-(2). 
18. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974); see also S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); Liljeberg v. Health 
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (''The general language of subsection (a) was designed to 
promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective 'in his opinion' 
standard with an objective test."). 
19. In 1924, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the original Canons of 
Judicial Ethics and over the course of the next five decades, a majority of states adopted them as well. In 1972, 
the House of Delegates adopted more explicit standards of judicial conduct, which were followed closely by the 
adoption of a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990. In February of 2007, the Model Code was 
superseded by a revised Code adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
(2007) available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approved_MCJC.html# (follow "ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, February 12, 2007'' hyperlink). Today, forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or 
another. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). 
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
is another ethical code adopted and revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States that applies to most 
federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. It does not, however, govern the Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme 
68 
McGeorge Law Review I Vol. 42 
The Code imposes a general standard that is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
Subsection (a) of rule 2.11 of the Code states: "A judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned ...."21 Impartiality means the "absence of bias or prejudice in 
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance 
of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge."22 Although 
the Code itself makes no mention of appearances, courts and commentators have 
focused on the appearance of impropriety in their interpretation,23 leaving judges 
with broad discretion in interpreting and applying this standard.24 In short, the 
Code and the federal disqualification statute are largely coterminous, and both 
indirectly impose appearance-based recusal standards. 
C. Due Process Clause 
1. Pre-Caperton 
Although the Constitution's Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right 
to have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges, 25 and the 
Supreme Court has periodically held that prejudice or bias by the presiding judge 
violates the litigant's constitutional rights,26 it has long been thought that the 
Constitution mandates disqualification only in very limited circumstances.21 The 
Supreme Court has explained that "matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, 
[and] remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of 
legislative discretion" rather than a constitutional recusal floor. 28 And until 
Caperton, it was unclear whether improper appearances alone could rise to the 
Court. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2003). 
21. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19, at R. 2.1 l(a). The rule goes on to list specific 
situations in which the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the list is not exhaustive. 
Id. at R. 2. 11. 
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (2007) 
23. Abramson, supra note 19, at 55 n.2 ("Whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned 
is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, the appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances."). 
24. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS LJ. 657, 679-80 (2005). 
25. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
26. See Jn re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process."). 
27. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("All questions of judicial qualification may not 
involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, 
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion."); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 
( 1997) ("[M]ost questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform 
standard."); Aetna Life lnsruace Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) ('The Due Process Clause demarks 
only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications."). 
28. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270 (1884)). 
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level of a due process violation. In fact, historically, there have been only two 
types of cases where the Due Process Clause was held to require recusal. 
First, the Due Process Clause has been read to require disqualification when 
the judge has a financial interest in the litigation. The leading case is Tumey v. 
Ohio.29 In Tumey, an Ohio statute authorized judges to receive court costs 
assessed against convicted defendants, but not against those who were 
acquitted.30 The Court held this incentive scheme created too much partiality and 
invalidated the statute on due process grounds, explaining that due process is 
violated when a judge is "paid for his service only when he convicts the 
defendant."31 This result is neither controversial nor surprising-a judge should 
not be incentivized to reach a particular result. 32 • 
However, a judge's interest need not be a direct financial one. For example, 
in Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, the Court held that a mayor may not preside as 
a judge over ordinance violations and traffic offenses when the court-assessed 
fines for such transgressions would be contributed to the town's budget.33 While 
the mayor's salary did not depend on his conviction rate, the mayor still had a 
financial incentive to convict-he was responsible for the town's revenue 
production.34 That incentive, the Court held, is inconsistent with due process. 35 
Similar incentives were held to violate due process in Aetna Life Insurance 
Co. v. Lavoie.36 There, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Embry ruled in favor of 
the plaintiff on his bad-faith claim against Aetna.37 It turned out, however, that 
Justice Embry himself had filed two comparable actions against other insurance 
companies making similar allegations and seeking punitive damages while the 
plaintiffs action against Aetna was still pending. 38 The Supreme Court held that 
Justice Embry's refusal to recuse himself was in violation of the Due Process 
Clause.39 As with Tumey and Ward, the judge's decision furthered his own 
financial interests, allowing him to act as "a judge in his own case."40 
29. Id. at 523. 
30. Id. at 519-20. 
31. Id.at531. 
32. Ronald Rotunda has likened this motivation to convict a defendant to contingency fees for judges. 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 249 (2010). 
33. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees that the court 
had imposed provided nearly one-half of the Village's annual revenue. Id. at 58 
34. Id. at 60. 
35. Id. 
36. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). 
37. Id. 
38. Id.at817. 
39. Id. at 824. The reason recusal was necessary was not because of Justice Embry's ill-will towards 
insurance companies. Rather, the opinion rendered by Justice Embry "had the clear and immediate effect of 
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case." Id. 
40. Id. 
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Second, the Court has held that due process forbids a judge from wearing too 
many hats. For example, in In re Murchison, the Court found a violation of the 
Due Process Clause although the judge did not have a personal pecuniary interest 
in the outcome of the case. 41 Rather, the judge had served as a one-person grand 
jury before presiding over a hearing to determine that two of the testifying 
witnesses were guilty of contempt.42 This procedure, the Court held, ran afoul of 
due process.43 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania is also instructive.44 There, the defendant verbally 
attacked the presiding judge 45 and continuously interrupted court proceedings to 
the point where the defendant had to be removed from the courtroom.46 The 
Supreme Court held that when the defendant is charged with criminal contempt, 
he "should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the 
contemnor. "47 
2. Post-Caperton 
Such was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause until 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 48 In Caperton, West Virginia Supreme Court 
Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding vote to overturn a trial court's decision 
against the appellant, Massey Coal Company.49 Before Justice Benjamin was 
elected to the court, Massey's CEO, Don Blankenship, provided generous 
support to his election campaign.50 Indeed, Blakenship contributed more to 
Benjamin's campaign than all other donors combined (a total of approximately 
$3 million), all while his lawyers were preparing the Caperton case for appeal. 51 
After refusing Caperton's recusal requests, Justice Benjamin voted with the 
majority in a 3-2 decision overturning the trial court's verdict.52 
41. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
42. Id. at 134-37. 
43. Id. 
44. 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). 
45. See id. at 456-57 (noting that the defendant referred to the judge as a "hatchet man for the State," a 
"dirty sonofabitch" and a "dirty, tyrannical old dog."). 
46. Id. at 462. 
47. Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a lawyer for contempt 
committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be heard in defense or mitigation. See 
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499-500 (1974). In such circumstances, a different judge should conduct the 
trial in place of the judge who initiated the contempt. Id. at 501-502. 
48. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
49. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008) (Benjamin, J. concurring). 
50. During the campaign, Mr. Blankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice Benjamin. 
However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions, was given directly to 
Benjamin. The rest of the money funded a tax-exempt organization, "And For The Sake Of The Kids," which 
was formed to defeat incumbent Justice McGraw, and newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw. 
See Brief for Petitioners at 5-8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No.08-22). 
51. Id. 
52. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008) (Benjamin, J. concurring). 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed; holding that Justice Benjamin's 
failure to recuse himself violated Caperton's right to due process.53 In reaching 
this decision, the Court relied on the principles announced in its prior decisions 
and applied them to the facts of the case at hand.54 Quoting Tumey, the Court 
once again announced that due process requires judicial recusal when the 
circumstances "offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead 
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."55 The Court explained that 
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or 
imminent," the risk of actual bias violates due process.56 
After Caperton, little doubt remains that recusal is required under the Due 
Process Clause, even when the judge has no personal interest in the outcome of 
the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a prosecutor or witness in the 
same case. But the question remains: What about appearances? Can an 
appearance of bias rise to the level of a due-process violation ?57 
Ill. DUE PROCESS AND THE "APPEARANCE OF BIAS" 
A. Are Appearance ofBias and Probability ofBias Synonymous? 
As Part II shows, recusal for almost all judges in the United States-at the 
state and federal levels-is governed by an appearance-driven standard. Of 
course, actual bias is prohibited as well, but rarely does a disqualification inquiry 
tum on a judge's actual bias. This is in large part due to the fact that judges 
deciding their own recusal motions tend to downplay the existence of actual bias. 
Furthermore, the appearance-of-bias test does not require parties to argue for 
actual bias.58 But does the Due Process Clause require only an absence of actual 
bias? Or does it prohibit even its appearance? Justice Benjamin himself took the 
position that due process does not require recusal based solely on the appearance 
of impropriety and at least some state courts agreed. 59 
53. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-67. 
54. Id. at 2260-2262. 
55. Id. at 2261-62. 
56. Id. at 2263-64. 
57. Compare Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't. of Corrs., 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[B]ad 
appearances alone do not require disqualification. Reality controls over uninformed perception"), with Peters v. 
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("Due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the 
appearance of bias."). 
58. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL REcUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS (2009) (discussing 
the differences between recusal standards based on the appearance of bias, on the one hand, and actual bias, on 
the other). 
59. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252; see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (2008) 
(Benjamin, J. concuning); see also State v. Canales, 916 A.2d 767, 781 (Conn. 2007) ("[A] judge's failure to 
disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises 
72 
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In Caperton, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve the issue. But by the 
time the case came up for oral argument, it was unclear whether Caperton had 
abandoned the argument that an appearance of bias alone was enough to trigger a 
due process violation. During oral argument, two interesting exchanges about the 
role of appearances under the Due Process Clause took place between the justices 
and counsel for Massey. First, Justice Stevens expressed incredulity that 
appearances alone could not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 
JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Frey, is it your position that the appearance 
of impropriety could never be strong enough to raise a constitutional 
issue? 
MR. FREY: Well, we might have appearance of impropriety 
overlapping with conditions that would justify-
JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm assuming appearances only. Are you saying 
that appearances without any actual proof of bias could never be 
sufficient as a constitutional matter? 
MR. FREY: I think we are. 

JUSTICE STEVENS: Is that your position? 

MR. FREY: We are saying that the Due Process Clause does not exist 

to protect the integrity or reputation of the State judicial systems. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why-
JUSTICE STEVENS: That's not an answer to my question. 
MR. FREY: Well, I thought I said ­
JUSTICE STEVENS: Supposing, for example, the judge had 
campaigned on the ground that he would issue favorable rulings to the 
United Mine Workers, and the United Mine Workers campaigned, 
raising money saying, we want to get a judge who will rule in our favor 
in all the cases we're interested in. Would that create an appearance of 
impropriety? 
MR. FREY: Well-
JUSTICE STEVENS: Or take another example. The Chief Justice 
asked what if there are ten members of a trade association and would 
all-and they all contributed to get a judge to vote in their favor in a case 
that involved a conspiracy charge among the--charged the ten of them 
for violations of the Sherman Act, something like that. And if all ten of 
them raise money publicly for the very purpose of getting a judge who 
from actual bias on the part of that judge."); Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 148 P.3d 1247, 1260 (Idaho 2006) 
("[W]e require a showing of actual bias before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant maintains a 
decision maker has deprived the proceedings of the appearance of fairness."). But see Allen v. Rutledge, 139 
S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark. 2003) ("Due process requires not only that a judge be fair, but that he also appear to be 
fair.") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Brandenburg, 114 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Ky. 2003) ("[T]here need not 
be an actual claim of bias or impropriety levied, but the mere appearance that such an impropriety might exist is 
enough to implicate due process concerns."); State v. Brown, 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Haw. 1989) (concluding 
that due process requires that justice "satisfy the appearance of justice"). 
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would rule favorably in their favor, that would clearly create a very 
extreme appearance of impropriety. Would that be sufficient, in your 
judgment, to raise a constitutional issue? 
MR. FREY: If you were-if-if you thought there was no basis for 
believing there was actual bias, but it looked bad-
JUSTICE STEVENS: No, it would meet the test in the-in the judges' 
brief of an average judge would be tempted under the circumstances. 
That's the test that the Conference of Chief Justices judges-
MR. FREY: That I don't-
JUSTICE STEVENS: And do you think that could ever, just 
appearance, could ever raise a due process issue? 
MR. FREY: No, I don't think just appearance could ever raise a due 
• 60process issue. 
Later in the argument, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the two phrases­
appearance of bias and probability of bias-are synonymous. 
MR. FREY: I don't-I think, first of all, the Petitioner has not 
advanced on the merits in this case an appearance standard. A lot of 
the-
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would you please clarify that? Because I was 
taking appearance, likelihood, probability as all synonyms .... 61 
The questioning suggests that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg-two of the 
five Justices in the Caperton majority-believe that (a) the mere appearance of 
bias can rise to the level of a due process violation and (b) that "appearance of 
bias" and "probability of bias" are interchangeable terms. Perhaps as a 
consequence, some scholars and commentators read the majority opinion in 
Caperton to hold that the appearance of impartiality may violate the Due Process 
Clause.62 
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) 
(No. 08-22), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf. 
61. Id. at 34-35. 
62. Cf Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal 
and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. REV. 359, 363-70 (2009) (discussing the terms "appearance," "perception," 
and "probability" and treating the terms as synonymous); Gerard J. Clark, Caperton's New Right to 
Independence in Judges, 59 Drake L. Rev. 661, 707 (2010) ("The Court's due process standard, however, is 
really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and judicial codes."). See also Joan Biskupic, Court 
Says Judges Must Avoid Appearance of Bias with Donors, USA TODAY, June 9, 2009, at 2A; Susan Kinniry, 
Demise of Judicial Elections and Lessons from the Lonestar State, June 20, 2010, http:/ljudgesonmerit. 
org/2010/02/18/ demise-of-judicial-elections-and-lessons-from-the-lonestar-state/ (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) ("Caperton plainly lays out that even the appearance of impartiality due to large campaign 
contributions may violate due process."). 
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Such a reading is incorrect. The majority opinion focuses not on appearances 
but rather on the probability that Justice Benjamin is actually biased.63 And 
probability of bias is not the same as appearance of bias, although many 
commentators-and even Justice Ginsburg-conflate the two. But the difference 
is crucial: An appearance-based standard focuses on the public's perception of 
the fairness of the court, while a probability-based standard centers on a 
reasonable judge's likelihood of actual bias. The subject of the former inquiry is 
a member of the public; the subject of the latter inquiry is the judge in question. 
These are two very different tests, and the relevant factors in determining 
whether the test is met may be wildly different. 
Two reasons support the view that the Court's majority opinion adopts the 
latter approach.64 First, the Court makes little mention of appearances throughout 
its opinion. Instead, it embraces the old constitutional test that focuses on 
"whether the contributor's influence on the election under all the circumstances 
'would offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to 
hold the balance nice, clear, and true. "'65 In other words, the spotlight is directly 
on the judge, not on the observations of the public, which is consistent with a 
probability-based disqualification standard. The majority opinion only uses the 
word "appearance" in two contexts: First, when discussing Justice Benjamin's 
own decision,66 and second, when explaining that most states have implemented 
an even more stringent, appearance-based standard for recusal. 67 In fact, the Court 
explicitly stated that the states' appearance-based codes "provide more protection 
than due process requires. "68 
Second, the majority explained that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a 
litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal 
••• • " 
69 Rather, the Court held Caperton is "an exceptional case."70 But as 
explained in greater detail below, there is nothing exceptional about this case 
from an appearance-of-bias perspective. Had the Court intended to adopt an 
appearance-based test for judicial recusal, Blankenship's contributions to Justice 
63. See, e.g., Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 ("On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to 
an unconstitutional level."). 
64. Cf Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the 
Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works. 
bepress.com/jeffrey_stempel/2 (follow "Download the Paper" hyperlink) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (arguing that the Supreme Court did not go far enough to make the due process recusal standard 
congruent with the prevailing state and federal recusal standards). 
65. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260-61, 2264-65. 
66. Id. at 2258. 
67. Id. at 2266 ("One must also take into account the judicial reforms the States have implemented to 
eliminate even the appearance of partiality.") (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at 2267. 
69. Id. at 2263. 
70. Id. 
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Benjamin would not be seen as extraordinary because even minor contributions 
f b. 71can create an appearance o ias. 
B. Why Caperton is Not an Easy Case 
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Caperton, various 
commentators expressed surprise that the Court was closely divided. Charles 
Geyh, an expert in judicial ethics who has written prolifically about judicial bias, 
and Stephen Gillers, a leading ethics scholar, both commented that the case was 
"easy ."72 Presumably, this is because of the large sum of money contributed by 
the defendant's CE0.73 Also focusing on the size of the contribution, Lawrence 
Lessig wrote "if contributions were small ... the fact that money was contributed 
to a judge's campaign could not lead anyone reasonably to believe that the 
contribution would affect any particular result."74 
Indeed, Caperton is an easy case if the Court is applying an appearance­
based recusal standard.75 Of course a large contribution or expenditure by one of 
the litigants to elect a judge creates an appearance of bias. But wouldn't a "mini­
Caperton" also be an easy case? Wouldn't a contribution of even a few hundred 
dollars to Justice Benjamin by Blankenship also create an appearance of bias? 
After all, research shows that even a small contribution-a contribution too small 
to play any role in the election's outcome-may create an appearance of 
impropriety.76 Even more surprising is a recent study showing that merely 
offering a campaign contribution creates an appearance of bias and partiality.77 In 
other words, relatively minor contributions-even those that are rejected-may 
produce an appearance of bias and lead some to question the judge's 
impartiality .78 
71. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
72. Marcia Coyle, Hot Recusal Case Debated: Justice Will Decide What Standard Due Process 
Requires, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=l20242 
8674548 (on file with the McGeorge law Review). 
73. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
74. Lawrence Lessig, Comment, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
104, 105-106 (2009). 
75. Professor Gillers seems to think that is exactly what the Court did in Caperton. He explained that 
"[t]he appearance of justice is just as important as justice.'' Coyle, supra note 72. 
76. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial 
Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, 23-24, (Oct. 19, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l428723 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink) (on file 
with the McGeorge law Review). According to a 2009 Harris Interactive poll conducted for Justice at Stake, 
eighty-five percent of all voters believe judges should not hear cases in which a litigant spent $50,000 or more 
to help elect them. Justice at Stake Campaign, Financial Limit Survey, http://staging.justiceatstake.siteviz 
enterprise.com/media/cms/Justice_at_Stake_Campaign_Final_Tab_ 44BOAF6D36565.pdf (last visited Oct. 9 
2010) (on file with the McGeorge law Review). 
77. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 76, at 23-24, 30. 
78. The Talmud proscribes that "even a judge who had refused a trivial favor from a litigant might find 
himself leaning in [the litigant's] favor." John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 
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Were a judge required to recuse herself every time a campaign contribution 
created an appearance of bias towards a contributor to her campaign, a 
contributor against her campaign, or even somebody whose contribution the 
judge declined, judges would be unable to adjudicate the very cases that they 
were elected to decide. Furthermore, if recusal were necessary every time a 
contributor appeared in front of a judge, judicial elections would become a major 
obstacle to the operation of the justice system. States created-and people 
overwhelmingly support-judicial elections to hold judges accountable for their 
decisions, and to strengthen the separation of power between the legislative and 
judicial branches.79 
An elected judiciary assumes that there will be campaign supporters and 
contributors-many of whom will be the very parties who will appear in front of 
the judge they worked to elect (or defeat). For example, a recent study showed 
that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2008 
and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contributed to the 
campaign of at least one of the justices.80 Even if that number is an aberration, 
surely the people and groups with the most interest in judicial elections are those 
who are most likely to appear in front of the judges. Requiring judges tc. recuse in 
such circumstances would unduly burden the courts and create opportunities for 
campaign contributors to game the system by offering contributions to judges 
perceived as unfavorable to their side.81 
If Caperton is not about appearances, but instead about the probability of 
actual bias, the case becomes much more difficult. What is the likelihood of 
actual bias when a litigant's CEO spends his own money on a judge's campaign? 
Would an offer of a campaign contribution, or a contribution too small to have 
made any difference in the outcome of the election, create an undue risk of 
bias?82 Whatever the answers to these questions, the recusal analysis is much 
more complicated when focus is shifted away from an appearance of bias and 
towards a probability of bias.83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 248 n.65 (discussing Jewish law's recognition of a judge's potential propensity toward 
bias). 
79. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial 
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1087-88 (2010); LARRY 0. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 164 (2004). 
80. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/campaign_ 
contributions_and_the_pennsylvania_supreme_court (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
81. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267-69 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(expressing this concern); see also Tuan Samahon, Caperton and Judicial Disqualification in Nevada, 17 
NEVADA LAWYER 28 (Jan. 2010) (responding to the concern "that litigants and their counsel will 'game the 
system' to obtain a preferred adjudicator by 'buying' disqualifications, i.e. by donating to disfavored judicial 
candidates."). 
82. The Supreme Court suggested that these circumstances would not rise to the level of a due process 
violation when it explained that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a 
probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal." Id. at 2263. 
83. Of course, even if the due-process disqualification standard is based on the probability of actual bias, 
most judges are still required to recuse based on the non-constitutional appearance-of-bias test contained in the 
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IV. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND DUE PROCESS: Is PROCEDURAL RECUSAL 
REFORM THE ANSWER? 
Adopting a probability-based recusal standard rather than an appearance­
based standard raises another important question: What procedures are 
appropriate for recusal? It is a question that is rarely asked-when it comes to 
recusal, procedure is often ignored.84 In fact, while substantive recusal standards 
have undergone significant transformation in the last few centuries as the 
public's view and understanding of the judiciary have changed, recusal 
procedures have remained stagnant. For example, neither 28 U.S.C. § 455 nor the 
judicial codes adopted by the states set out guidelines for what procedures should 
be followed in the event disqualification is sought. In Caperton, the Court had an 
opportunity to address the issue and prescribe certain procedures, but it declined 
to do so. It is time for a fresh approach, one where disqualification procedures 
under the Due Process Clause are tailored to the substantive recusal standards set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Caperton, so that they reflect the modern 
understanding of judicial bias and the judicial role. 
There are three reasons why new procedures for disqualification are 
necessary under the Due Process Clause and Caperton's probability-of-bias 
recusal test. First, recusal procedures must be tailored to the substantive standard 
for judicial disqualification. Caperton' s new substantive standard calls for a 
consideration of a new procedure at the very least, and it may even require it. 
Second, eliminating the role of appearances in the substantive disqualification 
standard under the Due Process Clause requires an increased emphasis on 
appearances in the disqualification procedures. Third, to give Caperton some 
teeth, states must address the corrosive effect of campaign contributions on 
judicial impartiality. The best way to do so, however, is not by eliminating 
judicial elections altogether, but by revising the disqualification procedures to 
limit the potential corrupting influence of money. 
A. 	 Tailoring Recusal Procedures to Caperton 's Probability-Based Recusal 
Standard 
Scholars commenting on judicial disqualification rarely ask whether existing 
disqualification procedures are appropriate for the substantive standard.85 As a 
result, while substantive recusal standards have gradually evolved in response to 
judicial controversies, recusal procedure has remained stagnant. One such 
federal disqualification statute and the Code of Judicial Conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 19. 
84. 	 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 
U. KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
85. Recent scholarship, however, has finally begun to pay attention to recusal procedures. See id. at 535 
(calling for the incorporation of the core tenets of legal process theory into recusal law). 
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procedure dictates that the very judge who is being asked to disqualify himself 
makes the disqualification decision, often without any written decision and 
subject to minimal appellate review. 86 Thus, one must ask whether the Supreme 
Court's pronouncement of a probability-based substantive disqualification rule 
calls for a new, concordant procedure. 
This Article posits that it does. For appearance-based recusal standards 
imposed by the federal disqualification statutes and the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
current recusal procedures (whereby a judge decides his own recusal motion) 
may be defensible, at least in theory. After all, in conducting the appearance-of­
bias inquiry, the judge determines whether a member of the public would 
perceive the judge to be biased. Whatever the problems with an appearance­
based recusal standard-it is imprecise, 87 it allows parties to flippantly accuse a 
judge of misconduct,88 and it may lead to over-recusal89-at the very least it is the 
type of inquiry that judges traditionally engage in and are generally very good 
at.90 
An appearance-driven recusal standard also presents a judge with the 
opportunity to avoid hearing the case without admitting any actual bias or 
impropriety. While this may be problematic in-itself,91 at least it makes recusal 
easier to stomach for some judges. 
But for the probability-based recusal standard established in Caperton-one 
that focuses on the likelihood that a judge is biased-self-recusal makes little 
sense. How can a biased judge, one that arguably owes one of the litigants a 
"debt of gratitude" for getting him elected, decide whether there is a probability 
of a bias in a given situation? Most people would agree that he cannot.92 The 
86. Norman L. Greene, How Great ls America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry Into the 
Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and 
Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 904 (2010) ("[A]ppellate courts 
typically affirm denials of recusal, and the burden of proof to be met by the party seeking recusal is 
substantial."). 
87. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA 
Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1337, 1338 (2006). 
88. Id. 
89. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit ofActual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
90. In a tort case, for example, a judge may consider how a reasonable person would have acted in a 
certain situation. In a libel case, the judge determines whether plaintiffs interpretation of the allegedly 
defamatory phrase is reasonable. 
91. Arguably, allowing judges to make recusal decisions based on mere appearances--on the 
perceptions of the "average person"-is nothing more than a fig leaf-a shield behind which judges can hide in 
order to avoid acknowledging that judges are human and are subject to bias and prejudice. Of course, using an 
appearance-based recusal standard, judges can pretend that actual judicial bias is not a problem and that recusal 
is necessary only because the public perceives a problem, not because there actually is a problem. 
92. Professor Geyh, in his response to this Article, suggests that mine is a distinction without a 
difference and that self-recusal is equally problematic regardless of the substantive standard. While I tend to 
believe, for the reasons already described, that the difference indeed matters, my proposal also has the benefit of 
allowing states to make a piecemeal procedural change, limited only to disqualification motions under the Due 
Process Clause. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection, Judicial Disqualification, and the Role of Money in 
Judicial Campaigns, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85 (2010). 
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same incentives that may lead a judge to favor one side on the merits may create 
an incentive for that same judge to find against recusal. Implementing procedural 
changes that address this problem will not only help foster fairness and 
impartiality in the judiciary, but it will also increase the public's confidence in 
the appearance of justice.93 
B. Keeping Appearances Relevant 
The Supreme Court's rejection of an appearance-based substantive recusal 
standard does not mean that appearances should play no role in our recusal 
jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause.94 In fact, appearances should 
continue to play a central role because of the importance of the appearance of 
impartiality to the judiciary. Take, for example, those nations where court rulings 
carry no weight and are routinely ignored.95 Judges, lacking both electoral 
legitimacy and political force, depend in large part on the public's acceptance of 
their authority.96 For the sake of self-preservation and to maintain their own 
legitimacy, courts should protect their reputation from public outrage and 
rejection. As Justice Stevens has said, "[i]t is confidence in the men and women 
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law."97 
Therefore, the public's perception of the fairness and impartiality of the courts is 
relevant to any discussion of recusal.98 
But questions remain as to precisely what role appearances should play. If 
appearance of bias is not the determining factor in judicial disqualification under 
the Due Process Clause, how should appearances be considered and who should 
consider them? This Article suggests that state legislatures, rather than 
93. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment ofDiscretionary 
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 734 (1994); James 
L. Gibson, Understandings ofJustice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 
LAW. & Soc'y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional 
Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & 
SOC'Y REV. 621, 621-22 (1991). 
94. Some scholars have sought to eliminate the role that appearances play in recusal analysis. For 
example, Professor Sarah Cravens has argued that an appearance-based recusal standard results in too many 
unnecessary recusals. Cravens, supra note 89, at 2-3. In her view, recusal rules should not be about promoting 
public confidence but about the elimination of bias. Id. She proposes that so long as judges are able to 
adequately explain their rulings, appearance should not play a role in recusal. /d. Similarly, Professor Ronald 
Rotunda has argued that the appearance-based recusal standards are too imprecise and make it too easy for 
litigants to seek a judge's recusal. Rotunda, supra note 87. He too argues in favor of abandoning an appearance­
based recusal standard. Id. 
95. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE ix (1974). 
96. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged By Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 
Stan. L. Rev. 155, 171 (2007). 
97. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98. Cf Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of "a judicial system that not only is impartial in fact, 
but also appears to render disinterested justice"). 
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challenged judges, should consider appearances in creating ex ante rules­
procedural guidelines-that would control judicial disqualification. These 
disqualification procedures should be designed to foster not only judicial 
impartiality, but also the public's confidence in the courts. In other words, in 
adopting new procedures for judicial disqualification, states must ensure that the 
procedures create an appearance of impartiality and fairness. Empirical research 
is necessary to determine precisely what those procedures may be, 99 but there are 
at least two rules that states must adopt: (a) a rule requiring a different judge or 
an impartial panel to rule on a disqualification motion; and (b) a rule requiring 
publication of an opinion explaining the rationale for a disqualification decision. 
If appearances are going to play any role in our recusal jurisprudence under the 
Due Process Clause, that role should be in the recusal procedures adopted by the 
states to address future Caperton motions. 
C. Making Caperton Matter 
Finally, there is yet another reason why the Court's adoption of a probability­
based recusal standard under the Due Process Clause should lead to procedural 
reform. Because Caperton adopts a less stringent recusal standard than was 
already in place in most states (see Parts II & III), Caperton itself is largely 
irrelevant unless states voluntarily make procedural changes to their 
disqualification practices. Undoubtedly, after Caperton, states should not leave 
the recusal decision to the challenged judge, and a number of states have 
grappled with making such changes to their recusal rules. If states combine 
Caperton's substantive probability-of-bias standard with a more aggressive 
procedural approach, the combination could increase in the public's confidence 
in the courts. 
On the other hand, states need not scrap or revise their current recusal rules 
altogether. The procedural changes proposed in this Article may only be 
necessary in the context of judicial elections, and only to address those problems, 
like those in Caperton, that are associated with the role of money in judicial 
campaigns. When it comes to judicial disqualification, lawyers and judges tend to 
think of bias as one monolithic category that should be addressed with a 
homogenous recusal standard. But there need not be one solution for all types of 
bias. and sometimes minor alterations with a scalpel will yield much better 
results than large-scale changes with a sledgehammer. When it comes to 
impartiality, election-related bias is very important and should be addressed by 
procedural changes, even if the same recusal procedures are retained in other, 
non-Caperton contexts. After all, empirical research suggests that judges who 
receive contributions from litigants may in fact be more likely to possess actual 
99. For example, further studies are necessary to determine what effect requiring other judges or 
independent panels to make disqualification decisions has on public confidence and perception of impartiality. 
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bias, '00 and that the public is truly concerned about the impartiality of elected 
judges. 101 This may be a good reason to treat recusal in the election context 
differently than other types of recusal (as when a judge presides over a case 
involving a former colleague). Large-scale procedural changes for all recusal 
motions may be a superior solution, but this is a good place to start. 
Procedural changes are most crucial in the context of judicial elections and 
due-process challenges of the kind seen in Caperton. Today, nearly eighty 
percent of Americans believe that elected judges are biased towards their 
contributors. 102 As a result, there is a movement, headed in part by former 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, to eliminate state judicial elections 
altogether. 103 Professor Meryl Chertoff s article included in this Symposium 
echoes the calls for the end of judicial elections. '04 But eliminating judicial 
elections is the wrong approach to alleviating this concern: Despite the perceived 
problems with judicial elections, the public still favors them and judicial 
elections remain extremely popular .105 Thus, rather than seeking to eliminate 
judicial elections, states should .begin implementing reforms that will address the 
problem, starting with recusal reform.106 And that reform begins with changes in 
recusal procedures for challenges under the Due Process Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is important for persons to see that judicial recusal is a key component in 
the tug-of-war between judicial independence and judicial accountability. 
Although judicial bias and recusal have always been issues of considerable 
importance, recusal has recently taken on an even greater importance that 
demands immediate attention. As judicial elections become "noisier, nastier and 
100. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623 (2009) 
(finding a "strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges' rulings" and demonstrating that 
elected judges "routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money"); Margaret S. Williams & 
Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence ofAttorneys' Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 
JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of 
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002). 
101. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52 (2003). 
102. See id. (explaining that while eighty percent of the public favors judicial elections, a similar 
number of people believes that elected judges are influenced towards their campaign contributors). 
103. See Tony Mauro, Reformers Hope High Court Decision Will Kill Judicial Elections, LAW.COM, 
Feb. 1, 2010, available at http:l/www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l202439680529 (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
104. Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Elections in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 47 (2010). 
105. Id. 
106. Election reform is also important, although the Court's decision in Republican Party v. White and 
Citizens United v. FEC may limit states' options. Some states, including West Virginia, have recently started 
experimenting with public financing for judicial elections, although the constitutionality of such measures 
remains in question. See THE NEW PoLmcs OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE 4 
(2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/d09ldc91 lbd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
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costlier,"w7 recusal reform becomes more and more important. In fact, it may be 
one of the best ways to retain the judicial elections that the public 
overwhelmingly supports while addressing the impartiality concerns and the 
corrupting influence of money that are inevitable in an elected judiciary. But the 
time for recusal reform is now. Public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary is diminishing, and people are rightly concerned about the impartiality 
of their courts. The public does not believe that elected judges can remain 
impartial when either a litigant or an attorney contributes significant amounts of 
money (perhaps even any money) to a judge's election campaign. Even judges 
themselves are unsure that their colleagues can be impartial when deciding cases 
involving those who helped get them elected. 108 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White and Citizens United v. FEC, judicial elections look more 
and more like legislative elections. Thus, recusal reform may be the best way--or 
perhaps the only way-to deal with the appearance of partiality that can be 
created by large campaign contributions to a judge in the course of an election. It 
is time for a new generation of recusal reform--one that is focused on reforming 
stagnant disqualification procedures rather than substantive rules. 
This Article proposed three procedural reforms that would respond directly 
to Caperton. First, states should tailor the recusal procedure to the substantive 
recusal standard. This means that a recusal procedure that worked for one 
substantive rule may not work for a different rule. Second, because the Supreme 
Court's decision in Caperton limited the role of appearance in the substantive 
disqualification standard, states must put greater emphasis on the appearance of 
fairness in developing disqualification procedures that will satisfy the Due 
Process Clause. Finally, states should feel free to create different recusal 
procedures for different factual situations. In other words, rather than following a 
single procedure every time a litigant seeks disqualification of a judge, states 
may create more stringent recusal procedures specifically for circumstances 
raising due-process concerns, as in Caperton. 
107. Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's 
Clothes ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 76 (1985). 
108. David E. Pozen, The Irony ofJudicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 305 (2008). 
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